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REIMAGINING POSTMORTEM CONCEPTION
Kristine S. Knaplund
ABSTRACT
Hundreds, likely thousands, of babies have been born years after a
parent has died. Thousands more people have cryopreserved their
sperm, ova, and embryos, or have requested that a loved one’s
gametes be retrieved after death to produce still more such children.
Twenty-three states have enacted statutes detailing how these
postmortem conception children can inherit from their predeceased
parents.
And yet, few of these children will be able to inherit. The statutes
create a bewildering array of standards, with over a dozen
definitions of consent, variations in signature and witnessing
requirements, and hurdles imposed in one state but not another. With
our mobile population, the odds that a consent executed in one place
will be accepted in another are small. With one exception—a New
York amendment effective in February 2021—the states exclude most
LGBT persons from being a postmortem parent. By failing to define
when conception occurs, the statutes provoke a fight with those who
use in vitro fertilization while both genetic parents are alive.
This Article is the first time that the laws of all 50 states are
examined to provide a comprehensive look at whether a postmortem
child inherits and determine how wildly disparate the legal standards
are from public sentiment. The Article details the precise ways the
law fails the problem and proposes four concrete solutions for states
to adopt.
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INTRODUCTION
Postmortem conception1—the implantation of an embryo months
or years after one (or both) of its parents has died—has now resulted
in hundreds of children being born in the United States. Thousands of
adults have stored their reproductive material for their own later use
to potentially create more embryos for later implantation. Americans
generally favor the idea of a partner using a loved one’s sperm or
eggs after death.2 In 2013, a random survey of 857 adults concluded
that 76% thought that postmortem conception (PMC) should be
allowed if the deceased were married at death, while 66% would
approve of it for an unmarried decedent. 3 Respondents were even
more likely to be supportive if the decedent had consented in writing,
with 81% in favor.4 Two surveys in 2012 and 2013 found wide
support for a partner retrieving sperm or ova from a recently
deceased partner to have a PMC child. 5 Brigham and Women’s
Hospital commissioned an online survey of attitudes towards PMC
after fielding one or two such requests a year; their 2012 survey of
1,049 U.S. adults found that close to 50% of respondents thought a
person should be able to retrieve gametes from a dead or dying
partner, most of whom conditioned the request on the decedent’s
written consent.6 A random survey of 846 adults published in 2013
found even greater acceptance of postmortem sperm retrieval—
especially if the decedent was married at death—with 67% of
respondents in favor if the couple was married and 51% in favor if
1. Postmortem conception differs from the traditional posthumous conception, long recognized at
common law, which allowed a child in utero at the time of a husband’s death to inherit from his estate.
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (2009).
2. See infra Section I.A.
3. Jason D. Hans & Brigitte Dooley, Attitudes Toward Making Babies . . . with a Deceased
Partner’s Cryopreserved Gametes, 38 DEATH STUD. 571, 575 (2014).
4. Id.
5. Amy Norton, Public Favors Posthumous Reproduction, with Consent, REUTERS: HEALTHCARE
& PHARMA, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-posthumous-reproduction/public-favors-posthumousreproduction-with-consent-idUSBRE86C0ZK20120713 [https://perma.cc/8G4C-ZYUC] (July 13, 2012,
2:31 PM); see also Jason D. Hans & Erin L. Yelland, American Attitudes in Context: Posthumous Sperm
Retrieval and Reproduction, 4 J. CLINICAL RSCH. & BIOETHICS (SPECIAL ISSUE), 2013, at 1, 5.
6. Norton, supra note 5.
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the couple was cohabiting.7 Respondents were more likely to be
supportive of PMC if the decedent’s wishes were known, with 74%
in favor regardless of whether the wishes were written or verbal;
even if the decedent’s wishes were unknown, however, 55% would
still support the request for postmortem retrieval. 8 In another
anonymous survey of 106 couples undergoing fertility treatments,
78% supported retrieving sperm or ova after death.9
Uniform and model acts have gradually progressed to reflect this
acceptance of PMC. The 1988 Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act (USCACA) barred PMC children from
inheriting “to avoid the problems of intestate succession which could
arise.”10 Only two states, North Dakota and Virginia, initially
adopted the provision, but both have now replaced it.11 In 2000, the
Uniform Parentage Act proposed that a spouse who consented in
writing would be a parent of a PMC child; in 2002, “spouse” was
changed to “individual.”12 Finally in 2008, the Uniform Probate Code
provided for PMC children in both intestacy and class gifts if the
decedent intended to be treated as a parent, which could be shown by
a signed record or by clear and convincing evidence.13 A person who
died married, with no divorce proceedings pending, was presumed to
have consented.14 Thus, in twenty years, the model acts went from a
presumption that no PMC child would inherit in the 1988 USCACA
7. Hans & Yelland, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. Gary S. Nakhuda et al., Posthumous Assisted Reproduction: A Survey of Attitudes of Couples
Seeking Fertility Treatment and the Degree of Agreement Between Intimate Partners, 96 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 1463, 1463, 1465 (2011).
10. Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip off the Old Ice Block: How Cryopreservation Has Changed
Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address It Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 347, 367 (2011) (quoting UNIF. STATUS OF CHILD. OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4 cmt.
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 1988)).
11. Id. at 368. North Dakota repealed the provision in 2005 and replaced it with the Uniform
Parentage Act. Id. Virginia amended the provision to allow a PMC child born within ten months of the
decedent’s death to inherit. Id.
12. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002) (amended 2017).
13. Carpenter, supra note 10, at 372.
14. Id. at 372–73. A 2008 model act by the American Bar Association, proposing a return to written
consent only limited to a married decedent, was the exception to this presumption, but no jurisdictions
adopted the language. Id. at 375.
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to a presumption that all PMC children of a married decedent would
inherit in the 2008 Uniform Probate Code, a position that better
reflects current public opinion.
Legislatures in twenty-four states have responded by answering the
difficult question of whether these PMC children can inherit from
their predeceased parent, with twenty-three statutes allowing the
child to inherit if certain conditions are met.15 Courts in another five
states with no current statute governing PMC inheritance have looked
at intestacy laws to ascertain if these laws, created at a time when
assisted reproductive technology did not exist, include PMC
offspring.16
And yet, even though we have been wrestling with this issue for
decades, the problem is by no means solved. 17 State statutes, which
often impose rigid requirements, are out of step with public sentiment
that PMC children should inherit.18 Questions arise in attempting to
define when “conception” occurs if a couple uses in vitro fertilization
(IVF) while both are alive but implants the embryo in a woman’s
womb after one parent has died. All but one of the state statutes raise
obstacles in consenting to be a parent of a PMC child for both those
who are infertile and for lesbian and gay couples. 19 The few hospital
protocols that have been adopted for obtaining sperm or ova
postmortem do not necessarily comport with the legal standards in
their states.20 Perhaps most importantly, in a mobile society where a
person may live in one state, undergo costly assisted reproductive
techniques in a second state, and die as a domiciliary in a third state,
the plethora of state-mandated consent procedures and formalities

15. Id. at 362.
16. Id.
17. W. Ombelet & J. Van Robays, Artificial Insemination History: Hurdles and Milestones, 7 FACTS
VIEWS & VISIONS OBGYN 137, 137 (2015). Precisely how long this issue has been debated is not known
because the first PMC birth was not recorded. Id. The assisted reproductive technology to create a PMC
child has been available since 1953 when the first human was conceived using frozen sperm. Id.
18. Carpenter, supra note 10, at 362.
19. Id. at 375.
20. See Katheryn D. Katz, Parenthood from the Grave: Protocols for Retrieving and Utilizing
Gametes from the Dead or Dying, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 300.
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mean that a document executed according to one state’s requirements
is unlikely to be accepted in another. 21
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the current state
of affairs by first examining how much reproductive material is now
stored and how much is obtained postmortem to determine the
likelihood that the number of PMC children will continue to expand.
Part I also provides a fifty-state overview of whether a PMC child
will be considered “issue” of the predeceased parent and thus inherit
from them. Part II examines in detail the many reasons this fifty-state
approach is unsatisfactory, such as requiring a PMC child to jump
through numerous hoops in short time periods, failing to define when
“conception” occurs, and omitting those who need a third person’s
sperm or ova to reproduce. Part III proposes solutions to the
twenty-six states yet to enact legislation and proposes amendments
for the states that have.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: DEMAND FOR POSTMORTEM
CONCEPTION AND THE LAW IN FIFTY STATES
In hundreds of cases, gametes retrieved either pre- or postmortem
have resulted in babies being born years after the genetic parent’s
death,22 which has been detailed in newspaper accounts,23 law review
articles,24 and requests for survivors’ benefits from Social Security.
21. See infra Section II.E.
22. A gamete is a “reproductive cell, either a sperm or an egg.” Kristin Brogaard, A Glossary of
Fertility Terms and Acronyms, PATHFERTILITY, https://pathfertility.com/fertility-glossary/
[https://perma.cc/EQP9-E49R].
23. See, e.g., Keith Oppenheim, Soldier Fathers Child Two Years After Dying in Iraq, CNN (Mar.
20, 2007, 10:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2007/US/03/20/oppenheim.btsc/ [https://perma.cc/9J76LAM2].
24. See generally John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027 (1994); Anne
Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901
(1997); Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security
Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251 (1999); Laurence
C. Nolan, Critiquing Society’s Response to the Needs of Posthumously Conceived Children, 82 OR. L.
REV. 1067 (2003); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115
(2008); Mary F. Radford, Postmortem Sperm Retrieval and the Social Security Administration: How
Modern Reproductive Technology Makes Strange Bedfellows, 2 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 33
(2009); Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing: Responding to the Existence of Afterdeath Children,
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From 1993 to 2015, cases in Arkansas,25 Arizona,26 California,27
Florida,28 Iowa,29 Louisiana,30 Massachusetts, 31 Michigan,32
Nebraska,33 New Hampshire, 34 New Jersey,35 New York,36
Pennsylvania,37 Utah,38 and Virginia,39 all explored the question of
whether a PMC was entitled to inherit. The Social Security
Administration declared in 2011 that it had received survivors’
claims from more than one hundred children conceived
postmortem.40 Cases also debated whether a long-ago settlor intended
to include postmortem grandchildren in his trust when he provided
for his children’s “issue.”41 Almost half the states have enacted
legislation specifically to deal with this phenomenon.42
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 403 (2009); Susan N. Gary, The Probate Definition of Family: A Proposal for
Guided Discretion in Intestacy, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 787 (2012).
25. Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Ark. 2008).
26. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex
rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541 (2012).
27. Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009).
28. Capato, 566 U.S. 541; Stephen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (M.D. Fla.
2005).
29. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011).
30. Brianne M. Star, A Matter of Life and Death: Posthumous Conception, 64 LA. L. REV. 613, 632
(2004) (citing Complaint at 3, Hart v. Shalala, No. 93-3944 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1993)).
31. Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002); Hanson v. Astrue, 733
F. Supp. 2d 214, 214–15 (D. Mass. 2010).
32. Mattison ex rel. M.M. & M.M. v. Soc. Sec. Comm’r (In re Certified Question from the U.S.
Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Mich.), 825 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Mich. 2012).
33. Amen v. Astrue, 822 N.W.2d 419, 420 (Neb. 2012).
34. Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007).
35. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
36. Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Astrue, No. 10 CV. 7544, 2013 WL 3357161, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 3,
2013); MacNeil ex rel. A.T.M. & C.E.M. v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-1398, 2016 WL 11476965, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2016); MacNeil v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 2017).
37. Seaman v. Colvin, 145 F. Supp. 3d 421, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
38. Burns v. Astrue, 289 P.3d 551, 553 (Utah 2012).
39. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 2011).
40. Anthony T. Selvaggio & Nancy E. Klotz, Aftereffects: New Legislation Addresses the
Inheritance Rights of a Posthumously Conceived Child, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J., Jan. 2015, at 30, 30.
41. See, e.g., In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d 775, 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
42. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Survey of State PMC Statutes and Court Decisions (2020) (on file
with the Georgia State University Law Review). Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming have statutes
allowing a PMC child to inherit if certain conditions are met. Id. Minnesota’s statute precludes all
children of assisted reproduction who are not in gestation at a parent’s death from inheriting. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 524.2-120 (West 2012).
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Are these children rare outliers, or are there indications that many
more such children will be born in the future? Two data points—the
enormous volume of reproductive material now being stored for a
person’s own use and the growing number of requests for retrieval of
sperm or ova from those who have recently died or are in a persistent
vegetative state—confirm that many more PMC children will be
born.
A. How Much Reproductive Material Is Now Stored?
1. Sperm Banking
Sperm, ova, and embryos can be frozen, thawed, and successfully
used years after a person has died. No estimates exist as to how many
men have cryopreserved their sperm for later use, but several facts
indicate that the number is in the thousands. First, the practice of
cryopreservation has been successfully employed by humans for
more than fifty years, since liquid nitrogen (rather than dry ice) came
into use as a preservative in 1963.43 The first human conceived with
frozen sperm was born even earlier in 1953. 44 No one knows how
long cryopreserved sperm remains viable; so far, the longest period
between storage and successful use is twenty-two years in one
report,45 and twenty-eight years in another.46
Second, men choose to bank sperm for a wide variety of reasons.47
Certain medical procedures will render them either temporarily or
43. Hamoun Rozati et al., Process and Pitfalls of Sperm Cryopreservation, 6 J. CLINICAL MED. 1, 1
(2017), https:// ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Pmc/articles/PMC5615282/ [https://perma.cc/B8XL-PME8]. See
generally William Perloff et al., Human Semen, Frozen and Stored in Liquid Nitrogen, Is Used
Successfully
by
Clinical
Investigators,
188
JAMA
39
(1964),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/1163380 [https://perma.cc/S3L9-PCGG].
44. Ombelet & Robays, supra note 17, at 140.
45. Kate Snow et al., Frozen Sperm Still Viable Decades Later, ABC NEWS,
https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/OnCall/story?id=7303722&page=1 [perma.cc/5X5Y-UWWH] (Apr. 10,
2009).
46. Sperm Banking FAQs, NEW ENG. CRYOGENIC CTR. INC., https://www.necryogenic.com/spermbanking-faqs [https://perma.cc/W5PU-UFSA].
47. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30
AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 36–37 (2004) (“It is now common practice for married males of reproductive age
with cancer to store sperm or testicular tissue prior to treatment.”); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr.,
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permanently infertile, and consequently they may cryopreserve sperm
in advance of treatments if they wish to have children later. 48 For
example, Eric MacNeil stored his sperm after his diagnosis of
non-Hodgkins lymphoma, and his widow used his cryopreserved
sperm after his death to give birth to fraternal twins.49 William
Kolacy, diagnosed with leukemia, banked his sperm on the same day
he began chemotherapy, and his widow, using his cryopreserved
sperm, gave birth to twin girls eighteen months after his death. 50
Sperm banking is also useful for those with spinal cord injuries or
other conditions that prevent ejaculation. 51 Minors may be advised to
bank their sperm before starting treatment. A 2010 childhood cancer
survivor study found that 46% of cancer survivors reported infertility
compared to only 17.5% of their siblings also reporting infertility.52
Third, even healthy men take steps to preserve their sperm. Before
deploying to the Middle East in 1991 and 2003, American soldiers
went to sperm banks in the event that exposure to chemical or
biological warfare affected their fertility. 53 A 2008 U.S. Army
pamphlet urged cryopreservation as part of the Soldier Readiness
Processing Training.54 Those about to undergo gender reassignment

Genetically Related Children: Harvesting of Gametes from Deceased or Incompetent Persons, 7 J.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 147, 162–64 (2011).
48. Robertson, supra note 47, at 35; Rozati et al., supra note 43, at 2. For example, a common
treatment for Hodgkin’s disease and other lymphomas, chlormethine, results in prolonged absence of
viable sperm for 90%–100% of patients. Rozati et al., supra note 43, at 4.
49. MacNeil ex rel. A.T.M. & C.E.M. v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-1398, 2016 WL 11476965, at *3–4
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2016).
50. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
51. Rozati et al., supra note 43, at 5. For example, 50%–75% of men with multiple sclerosis report
ejaculatory dysfunction. Id.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Kathleen Doheny, War Prompts Planning for Future Families: Coping: As Men Face
Deployment, Couples Turn to Sperm Banks., L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 1991, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-02-04-vw-534-story.html
[https://perma.cc/XKM8XMKD]; Valerie Alvord, Some Troops Freeze Sperm Before Deploying, USA TODAY,
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-01-26-bank-usat_x.htm
[https://perma.cc/38E34TM5] (Jan. 27, 2003, 12:44 AM); Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last
Will, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 91 (2004).
54. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Dead Soldiers and Their Posthumously Conceived Children, 31 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 74, 80 (2015).
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may also bank their gametes. 55 In a 2015 Ethics Committee opinion,
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine recommended
offering cryopreservation to all individuals undergoing
reassignment.56 In all these cases, the gametes are not donated to
others but are frozen for the person’s own later use.57
2. Cryopreserved Embryos
The technology to freeze and successfully thaw human embryos
was developed about thirty years after the cryopreservation of
sperm,58 with the first successful human pregnancy using a
cryopreserved embryo reported in 1983. 59 Since then, thousands of
embryos have been frozen each year, with estimates that a million or
more are now cryopreserved. 60 The number is so large for at least
four reasons. First, IVF, in which a woman undergoes hormone
treatment to produce and retrieve eggs that are then fertilized, is

55. Lux Alptraum, A Startup Looks to Reinvent Sperm Banking — and Serve Trans Women,
ONEZERO (Aug. 20, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/a-startup-looks-to-disrupt-sperm-banking-andserve-trans-women-fefcef54e18a [https://perma.cc/UP4N-7N74].
56. Rozati et al., supra note 43, at 5.
57. Ivor Davis, Posterity Insurance, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 26, 1988), chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm1988-04-26-8803110983-story.html [https://perma.cc/F2SV-42RH] (reporting that 2,000 of 2,400
depositors at California Cryobank had banked sperm for their own use). Sperm banks routinely post lists
of “who should bank” and advertise their storage fees. See, e.g., Getting a Vasectomy? Consider Storing
Your Sperm First, SEATTLE SPERM BANK, https://www.seattlespermbank.com/getting-a-vasectomystore-your-sperm-first/ [https://perma.cc/GCW6-MUBC]; Sperm Banking Price List, NEW ENG.
CRYOGENIC CTR. INC., https://www.necryogenic.com/sperm-banking-pricelist/ [https://perma.cc/HGD24XBQ];
Pricing
&
Payment
Plans,
CRYOCHOICE
PRIV.
SPERM
BANKING,
https://cryochoice.com/pricing-sperm-banking/ [https://perma.cc/D3FN-LPMP].
58. Embryo cryopreservation is “[t]he process of freezing one or more embryos to save them for
future use. [It] involves in vitro fertilization, a procedure in which eggs are removed from a woman’s
ovary and combined with sperm in the laboratory to form embryos.” Embryo Cryopreservation, NAT’L
CANCER
INST.,
https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/embryocryopreservation [https://perma.cc/9ZPN-FSBZ].
59. Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights
Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 55 (1999).
60. Caroline Lester, Embryo ‘Adoption’ Is Growing, but It’s Getting Tangled in the Abortion
Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/17/health/embryo-adoptiondonated-snowflake.html [https://perma.cc/M6AK-U4SV] (noting estimates between 600,000 and one
million); Marilynn Marchione, In Limbo: Leftover Embryos Challenge Clinics, Couples, AP NEWS (Jan.
17, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/046d6fbc4c564caebac7e560cd87a26a (“One study estimated there
were 1.4 million in the U.S.”).
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expensive,61 and it may have side effects. 62 Cryopreserving some of
the resulting embryos means a later attempt at pregnancy will not
require the entire cycle of hormones and retrieval. 63 Doctors retrieve
and fertilize as many eggs as possible in the initial attempt, with the
harvesting of about fifteen eggs seen as optimal. 64 The excess
embryos are stored for later use. 65 In 2017, 31% of those starting IVF
said that banking their egg or embryo was one reason they used
assisted reproduction.66
Second, as IVF becomes more successful, doctors need to implant
fewer embryos, leaving more to be stored for future use. In 2000,
61. IVF Cost: Analyzing the True Cost of In Vitro Fertilization, CNY FERTILITY,
https://www.cnyfertility.com/ivf-cost/ [https://perma.cc/2ZB6-CZ5W] (Oct. 12, 2020). CNY Fertility
states that the national average for one IVF cycle is about $20,000, including medications. Id. Total
costs for a live birth are generally much higher; one source estimated the cost at between $66,000 and
$114,000. Katie Falloon & Philip M. Rosoff, Who Pays? Mandated Insurance Coverage for Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 16 AMA J. ETHICS 63, 63 (2014). Currently sixteen states mandate insurance
coverage for assisted reproductive technology (ART) procedures. State Laws Related to Insurance
Coverage
for
Infertility
Treatment,
NCSL
(June
12,
2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-infertility-laws [https://perma.cc/XVW8RPVW].
62. Fact Sheet of Side Effects of Injectable Fertility Drugs (Gonadotropins), AM. SOC’Y FOR
REPROD. MED., https://www.reproductivefacts.org/globalassets/rf/news-and-publications/bookletsfactsheets/english-fact-sheets-and-infobooklets/side_effects_of_injectable_fertility_drugs_gonadotropins_factsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5CMZ-CC8W]. Ten to twenty percent may see enlarged ovaries and accumulation of
fluid in the abdomen, with severe cases resulting in nausea, vomiting, blood clots, and other symptoms.
Id.
63. Coleman, supra note 59, at 59. Hormone stimulation usually results in the retrieval of more eggs
than can be safely implanted at one time, so the excess is generally cryopreserved. Id.
64. Sesh Kamal Sunkara et al., Association Between the Number of Eggs and Live Birth in IVF
Treatment: An Analysis of 400 135 Treatment Cycles, 26 HUM. REPROD. 1768, 1774 (2011).
65. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2005
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC
REPORTS
54,
85
(2007),
https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/archived/2005ART508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJZ6-XCFL]. In 2005, even though only 15% of ART cycles used frozen nondonor
embryos, 98% of the 422 reporting clinics offered cryopreservation. Id. at 85. The following year, with
426 clinics reporting, frozen nondonor embryos were used in 16% of ART cycles, and 100% of the
clinics offered cryopreservation. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY
AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 54, 89 (2008), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/archived/2006ART_508tagged.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPN3-333C].
66. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2017
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT 23 (2019)
[hereinafter 2017 CDC ART SUCCESS RATES], ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2017-ClinicReport-Full.pdf.
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three or more embryos were implanted in two-thirds of all IVF
transfers in the United States. 67 That proportion declined to 39% by
2008.68 In 2002, only 1% of patients under age thirty-five with good
prognoses had a single-embryo transfer.69 By 2009, after the Society
for Assisted Reproductive Technology revised its guidelines, 70
single-embryo transfers for women under thirty-five rose to 10%,
resulting in far more excess embryos.71 As is the case with
cryopreserved sperm, we do not know how long embryos can be
frozen. Researchers have speculated that a frozen embryo may still
be viable after fifty years.72 The longest report so far has been a child
born after an embryo was cryopreserved for twenty-seven years.73
Third, cryopreservation allows for preimplantation genetic
testing.74 The future parent can ascertain if any embryos have certain
hereditary diseases or genetic abnormalities before selecting any for
implant.75 In 2017, 11% of those using assisted reproductive
technology (ART) reported preimplantation genetic testing as a
reason for using assisted reproduction.76 Although approximately
16% of all ART cycles in 2007 used frozen embryos, 77 that number

67. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Elective Single-Embryo Transfer, 97 FERTILITY & STERILITY 835,
835 (2012).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2007
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC
REPORTS
67
(2009)
[hereinafter
2007
CDC
ART
SUCCESS
RATES],
https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/archived/COMPLETE_2007_ART_508tagged.pdf [https://perma.cc/D72QLAFZ].
71. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 67.
72. Coleman, supra note 59, at 60.
73. Angeline Jane Bernabe, Baby Born from 27-Year-Old Frozen Embryo Breaks Record, GMA
(Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.goodmorningamerica.com/wellness/story/baby-born-27-year-frozenembryo-breaks-record-74469304 [https://perma.cc/J38V-4T6K]. The previous record, set in 2017, was
twenty-four years. Sarah Zhang, A Woman Gave Birth from an Embryo Frozen for 24 Years, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/12/frozen-embryo-ivf-24years/548876/ [perma.cc/V357-R6GN].
74. Min Liu et al., Assessment of Clinical Application of Preimplantation Genetic Screening on
Cryopreserved Human Blastocysts, REPROD. BIOLOGY & ENDOCRINOLOGY, Apr. 2016, at 1, 1.
75. Id.
76. 2017 CDC ART SUCCESS RATES, supra note 66.
77. 2007 CDC ART SUCCESS RATES, supra note 70, at 56.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/6

12

Knaplund: Reimagining Postmortem Conception

2021]

REIMAGINING POSTMORTEM CONCEPTION

917

increased to about 69% of ART cycles ten years later. 78 We now
have the technology to not only identify gene mutations but also to
correct some of them, particularly those created by a single gene. 79
Although this gene editing is highly controversial,80 some predict that
it may become available in as few as ten years, 81 encouraging even
more Americans to use ART and store their excess embryos.
Fourth, with more patients cryopreserving their embryos and
implanting fewer of them, many patients face the dilemma of what to
do with the embryos they do not implant. By all accounts, patients do
not appear to be destroying or donating large numbers of them.82 A
small number of these embryos—perhaps 5% to 7%—have likely
been abandoned due to the nonpayment of storage fees. 83 Many
patients who originally intended to donate them have reconsidered. A
2001 letter to the New England Journal of Medicine stated that 82%
of couples who initially chose to donate surplus embryos to another
couple and 88% of those who said they would donate to research
later changed their minds, leaving the embryos in storage. 84 A study
78. 2017 CDC ART SUCCESS RATES, supra note 66.
79. Giovanni Rubeis & Florian Steger, Risks and Benefits of Human Germline Genome Editing: An
Ethical Analysis, 10 ASIAN BIOETHICS REV. 133, 140 (2018). “[C]ystic fibrosis, sickle-cell disease, and
Duchenne muscular dystrophy[] [are] all monogenic diseases that result from a single mutation along
the human genome.” Raymond C. O’Brien, The Immediacy of Genome Editing and Mitochondrial
Replacement, 9 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 419, 434 (2019).
80. O’Brien, supra note 79, at 443–44 (discussing the birth of twins in China in 2018 following
genome editing). A statement issued by the Organizing Committee of the Second International Summit
on Human Genome Editing declared that the committee found the claim that the Chinese scientist had
altered the genomes to create the twins “deeply disturbing” and that the procedure was “irresponsible”
and “failed to conform with international norms.” Statement, Org. Comm. of the Second Int’l Summit
on
Hum.
Genome
Editing
(Nov.
28,
2018),
https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2018/11/statement-by-the-organizing-committee-of-thesecond-international-summit-on-human-genome-editing [https://perma.cc/PFN7-SJMM]. A recent study
found that the technology made “unintended and unwanted changes, frequently eliminating an entire
chromosome or large sections of it.” Amy Dockser Marcus, Crispr Gene Editing Can Lead to Big
Mistakes in Human Embryos, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/crispr-gene-editing-can-leadto-big-mistakes-in-human-embryos-11603983608 [https://perma.cc/RS5D-8ZBW] (Oct. 29, 2020, 11:00
AM).
81. Antonio Regalado, Engineering the Perfect Baby, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 5, 2015),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2015/03/05/249167/engineering-the-perfect-baby/
[https://perma.cc/CLY8-4ELJ].
82. See Marchione, supra note 60.
83. Id.
84. Robert D. Nachtigall et al., Parents’ Conceptualization of Their Frozen Embryos Complicates
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of forty-two cancer survivors who had cryopreserved their embryos
before their treatment found that 56% still had embryos in storage
fifteen years later, even though the mean age of the participants was
then thirty-nine years old.85 One state, Louisiana, severely restricts a
couple’s options for surplus embryos by prohibiting their
destruction.86 Thus, a huge percentage of these cryopreserved
embryos continue to be available indefinitely for future use.87
3. Cryopreserved Ova
The successful cryopreservation of unfertilized ova is the most
recently developed technology, with the first baby born in 1986.88
Thus, the number of cryopreserved eggs is likely small. Still, that
number is rapidly growing. 89 Women without a male partner or
women who do not wish a male partner to have a say in the
disposition of embryos can choose to freeze ova instead of an
embryo. In addition, many women freeze their ova because they are
about to undergo either a procedure that will affect their fertility or
gender reassignment.90 Since the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine declared in 2012 that egg freezing was no longer an
experimental procedure, 91 an increasing number of women, including
the Disposition Decision, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY 431, 431 (2005).
85. J. Barcroft et al., Fifteen Year Follow-Up of Embryos Cryopreserved in Cancer Patients for
Fertility Preservation, 30 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 1407, 1407, 1410 (2013).
86. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2018). In Kentucky, public medical facilities may do research on
embryos so long as it does not result in their intentional destruction. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715(1)
(West 2018).
87. See Marchione, supra note 60.
88. Carpenter, supra note 10, at 356.
89. Id.
90. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., FACT SHEET: FEMALE CANCER, CRYOPRESERVATION, AND
FERTILITY
1
(2014),
https://www.reproductivefacts.org/globalassets/rf/news-andpublications/bookletsfact-sheets/english-fact-sheets-and-infobooklets/female_cancer_cryopreservation_and_fertility_factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWU5-2PSV];
Angie Leventis Lourgos, Before They Transition, Some Transgender Youth Preserve Fertility by
Banking Sperm or Eggs, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 3, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ctmet-transgender-reproduction-20180308-story.html [https://perma.cc/23WU-22Y5]; Julie Compton,
Transgender Men, Eager to Have Biological Kids, Are Freezing Their Eggs, NBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2019,
5:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/transgender-men-eager-have-biological-kids-arefreezing-their-eggs-n975331 [https://perma.cc/WX2K-8B3N].
91. Caitlin Hagan, Experts: Egg Freezing No Longer “Experimental,” CNN (Oct. 19, 2012, 2:52
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those not ready for motherhood, have stored their ova as fertility
insurance, with the market growing about 25% a year.92
B. A Second Data Point: The Increasing Demand for Retrieval of
Sperm or Ova from the Recently Deceased or Those in a
Persistent Vegetative State
In addition to those who have stored their reproductive material for
their own use, there have been many requests to retrieve sperm or
ova after a loved one has died or entered a permanent vegetative
state. The first reported request for postmortem retrieval of gametes
was in 1980.93 By 1995, there were eighty-two requests for
postmortem sperm retrieval recorded at forty facilities in the United
States, none of which had protocols for dealing with the requests. 94
NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital, among other facilities, then adopted
guidelines specifying consent procedures.95 By 2002, twenty-one
facilities had formal policies. 96 Family members have also made
requests to retrieve ova postmortem, 97 although these requests are
much rarer than those for sperm retrieval. 98
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2012/10/19/health/eggfreezing/index.html#:~:text=Freezing%20a%20woman’s%20eggs%20should,now%20standard%20for
%20infertility%20treatment [https://perma.cc/BZ7L-BRU7].
92. Mary Pflum, Egg Freezing ‘Startups’ Have Wall Street Talking – and Traditional Fertility
Doctors Worried, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/health/features/egg-freezing-startups-havewall-street-talking-traditional-fertility-doctors-n978526 [https://perma.cc/VCQ4-UX5Y] (Mar. 4, 2019,
7:16 PM) (reporting that 475 women froze their eggs in 2009 and that 7,300 women froze their eggs in
2016).
93. Carson Strong, Consent to Sperm Retrieval and Insemination After Death or Persistent
Vegatative State, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 243, 244 (2000).
94. Frances R. Batzer et al., Postmortem Parenthood and the Need for a Protocol with Posthumous
Sperm Procurement, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1263, 1263 (2003).
95. Postmortem Sperm Retrieval (PMSR), WEILL CORNELL MED. UROLOGY [hereinafter PMSR],
https://urology.weillcornell.org/postmortem-sperm-retrieval [https://perma.cc/HQ9Z-G9XF].
96. Batzer et al., supra note 94.
97. David M. Greer et al., Case 21-2010: A Request for Retrieval of Oocytes from a 36-Year-Old
Woman with Anoxic Brain Injury, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 276, 276 (2010); Ryan Jaslow, Dead Girl’s
Family Harvests Her Eggs: Was It Unethical?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 11, 2011, 4:29 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dead-girls-family-harvests-her-eggs-was-it-unethical/
[https://perma.cc/76SA-DY2W].
98. Shelly Simana, Creating Life After Death: Should Posthumous Reproduction Be Legally
Permissible Without the Deceased’s Prior Consent?, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 329, 338 (2018) (noting that
retrieving and using eggs postmortem is more medically complex than for sperm and that cultural
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A key issue in deciding whether to retrieve gametes from someone
who has died or is in a vegetative state is consent. In several reported
cases, courts examined whether the decedent had completed an organ
donor form.99 Although judges may regard these forms as germane to
the issue of consent, scholars generally see organ donor forms as
inapplicable to gamete retrieval. 100 “Solid-organ donation and sperm
donation are not practically or ethically equivalent,” argue three
bioethicists; sperm is not scarce and cannot cure any medical
condition, and the person making the request expects to use it
herself.101 Further, the three organ removal purposes authorized by
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act—transplantation, therapy, or
research102—do not apply to PMC.103 If courts in states with no
legislation on this matter follow the case law rather than the scholars,
the postmortem retrieval of gametes has the potential to skyrocket.
As of 2020, more than 156 million American adults, or 60% of those
older than eighteen, had registered as organ donors.104
C. Current Legal Climate in All Fifty States
Twenty-four states have enacted legislation to determine if a child
conceived after a parent’s death can inherit. 105 All but one have

attitudes are different regarding postmortem reproduction for men and women); Jennifer S. Bard &
Lindsay Penrose, Responding to Requests for Assisted Reproductive Technology Intervention Involving
Women Who Cannot Give Consent, 25 HEALTH MATRIX 227, 240–41 (2015) (noting that although
postmortem retrieval of sperm is “a relatively simple procedure,” women undergoing egg retrieval
usually require two weeks of intensive hormone treatment).
99. In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d 775, 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). Contra Robertson v. Saadat, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 215, 231 (Ct. App. 2020).
100. Katz, supra note 20, at 305–06.
101. Batzer et al., supra note 94, at 1266.
102. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2006)
103. Strong, supra note 93, at 250.
104. Organ Donation Statistics, ORGANDONOR.GOV, https://www.organdonor.gov/statisticsstories/statistics.html [https://perma.cc/26Q2-XXKJ] (Sept. 2020); DONATE LIFE AM., NATIONAL
DONATE LIFE MONTH – APRIL 2020 DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION STATISTICS (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.donatelife.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2020-NDLM-Donation-and-TransplantationStatistics-FINAL-1.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK44-NC6Z].
105. For a list of all fifty states plus the District of Columbia and their statutes or court decisions on
PMC, see Knaplund, supra note 42.
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decided that the answer is yes if certain conditions are met. 106
Another six states have answered the question through court
decisions.107 Both the legislation and the court decisions allowing
PMC children to inherit generally address two main concerns: how to
allow PMC to inherit while still maintaining the orderly
administration of estates, and how to establish that the decedent has
consented to the PMC child’s inheritance.
1. Addressing Orderly Administration of Estates
Because genetic material is currently stored by thousands of adults,
remains viable for decades, and can be obtained after death, the
potential to disrupt the orderly administration of estates is real.
Legislation has addressed this concern in two ways: by mandating
limits on when the genetic material must be used, and by requiring
notice to the decedent’s personal administrator within a few months
of opening the estate so that all assets are not distributed before the
child is born.108
Five states currently have legislation that contains both safeguards:
New York, California, Oregon, Connecticut, and Illinois.109 New
York is unique in requiring that a decedent’s consent to PMC must be
executed within seven years of death with two witnesses present, and
the written consent must be recorded after death. 110 Otherwise, the
statutes of New York, California,111 and Oregon are similar.112 If the
decedent’s genetic material is used, 113 the statutes require: (a) the
decedent’s written consent to use his or her reproductive material
after death and designation of a person to use or control it; (b) that

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3 (McKinney 2012); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 249.5 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077 (2016).
109. See Knaplund, supra note 42.
110. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3.
111. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(b)–(c).
112. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077.
113. If the decedent is not the genetic parent, New York’s requirements are slightly less onerous. See
infra Section II.D.
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the designated person notify the decedent’s personal representative
that such material is available for use either within four months
(California and Oregon) or seven months (New York) after the
decedent’s death or the appointment of the personal representative;
and finally, (c) the child to be in utero within two years of decedent’s
death.114 Oregon further requires that the decedent’s will or trust
provide for the PMC child. 115 A fourth state, Connecticut, has similar
requirements but with shorter time periods: the notice that the
material is available must be given to the personal representative
within thirty days of appointment, and the child must be in utero
within one year after decedent’s death.116 A fifth state, Illinois, has
longer time periods than Connecticut and a presumption that PMC
children are excluded.117 Illinois extends the time by which the child
must be born to within thirty-six months of the decedent’s death.118
Several firms in Illinois reassure clients that a typical probate case
takes about six to twelve months to close, 119 but the statute requires
notice to the administrator within six months of the decedent’s death
that the decedent’s genetic material is available and may be used,
thus alerting the administrator that the estate should remain open. 120
An additional four states do not require notice to the personal
representative that the decedent’s reproductive material is available,
but their statutes impose short enough time limits that the estate
might still contain undistributed assets for the child to inherit. 121

114. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3; CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5; OR. REV. STAT.
§ 112.077.
115. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077(4)(b).
116. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-785 (2019). Connecticut limits the person designated by the decedent
to the decedent’s spouse, and both the decedent and the spouse must sign the writing. Id. Failure to
notify the administrator does not affect the PMC child’s right to inherit. Id.
117. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3 (West 2007).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., How Long Does Probate Take in Illinois?, LAW OFF. OF KEVIN WILLIAMS,
https://www.kevinwilliamslaw.com/faqs/frequently-asked-probate-questions/how-long-does-probatetake-in-illinois/ [https://perma.cc/N4AR-VNXB]; Krause Donovan Estate Law Partners, Things to Know
About the Probate Process in Illinois, EST. L. PARTNERS LLC (June 11, 2019),
https://www.estatelawpartners.com/the-probate-process-in-Illinois/ [https://perma.cc/UWC7-8BBM].
120. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3.
121. See Knaplund, supra note 42.
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Although only ten or so states have statutory prescriptions on when
probate must close,122 most estates close within one to two years. 123
Thus, assuming probate opens promptly, the child will not be able to
inherit from the decedent unless the child is in utero within two years
of the decedent’s death. Of course, that child might still be able to
file for Social Security benefits as the decedent’s surviving
dependent,124 or the child may still inherit through the decedent from
the decedent’s parent’s will or trust, for example. 125
Of the four states that do not require notice to the administrator
that a decedent’s genetic material may be used postmortem, the one
requiring the promptest action is Virginia. Initially, Virginia was one
of only two states that adopted the 1988 USCACA, which provided
that PMC children had no interest in their deceased parents’
estates.126 Virginia later amended its statute to provide that a child
who was conceived after the death of a parent could inherit from the
deceased parent if the child was born within ten months of the
122. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Survey of State Probate Proceedings (2020) (on file with the Georgia
State University Law Review). Missouri and Ohio have the shortest deadlines. Id. Missouri requires a
final accounting six months and ten days after first publication of notice of letters of administration
unless good cause is shown. MO. ANN. STAT. § 473.540(2)(1) (West 2009). Ohio mandates a final
accounting within six months of appointment unless a listed exception applies. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2109.301(B) (LexisNexis 2016). Iowa and North Dakota have the longest deadlines at three years,
stating that the final settlement should be filed unless the court orders otherwise or an heir or distributee
can petition for the personal representative to show cause why the estate should remain open. IOWA
CODE ANN. § 633.473 (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-21-03.1 (2010).
123. See, e.g., Wills, Estates, and Probate, CAL. CTS.: THE JUD. BRANCH OF CAL.,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/8865.htm?rdeLocaleAttr=en [https://perma.cc/2S7A-TGXC] (stating that a
typical California probate case can take between nine months to one and a half years, or longer);
Answers to Your Probate Questions, BPS LAWS., https://www.bpslawyers.com/estate-planningprobate/faq-death-probate/ [https://perma.cc/D6R4-BXU7] (stating that a typical Connecticut probate
case can take between “[fifteen] to [eighteen] months [as] a realistic estimate”); Lane V. Erickson, 3
Things to Know About Idaho Probate, RACINE OLSON (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.racinelaw.net/blog/3things-know-idaho-probate/ [https://perma.cc/C26A-Y9QW] (stating that a typical Idaho probate case
can take between at least six months and sometimes more than two years). For a list of the probate
procedures of all 50 states, see Knaplund, supra note 122.
124. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000);
Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002).
125. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction vs. Old Dynasty Trusts: A New
Approach, 57 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 301, 302–03 (2020). The child may encounter further obstacles if
donated gametes or a gestational carrier is used. Id.
126. Carpenter, supra note 10. North Dakota, which has since repealed the provision, was the other.
Id.
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death.127 Arkansas provides that the PMC child must be conceived
within twelve months and born within nineteen months of the
decedent’s death.128 In addition to requiring the decedent’s written
consent, two states, Iowa and Maryland, 129 specify that the child must
be born within two years of the decedent’s death. Is this time limit
short enough that, even without notice to the personal representative
a few months after appointment, the estate might still be open? It
may be short enough in Arkansas; a firm in the state estimates
probate to take six to nine months and generally not longer than
eighteen months.130 Iowa’s longer time limit is problematic for
inheritance. Iowa Legal Aid’s Probate Questions and Answers notes
that “[m]ost estates can be probated in less than one year.”131 Imagine
this scenario in Iowa: A decedent is survived by his second wife and
a child of his first marriage. He has given his written consent for his
second wife to use his cryopreserved sperm to conceive a child
postmortem. Iowa intestacy law provides that his wife will receive
half of his real property, all personal property “in the hands of the
decedent as the head of a family,” and half of the remaining personal
property;132 anything not going to the surviving spouse goes to his
issue.133 If probate opens and closes promptly, before his wife
finishes grieving and has a PMC child, his “issue” would mean only
the child from his first marriage. If probate is still open when his
spouse gives birth to PMC twins within two years of his death, those

127. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164 (2016).
128. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2012). The writing must be notarized or witnessed by a licensed
physician or someone acting under the supervision of a licensed physician. Id.
129. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West 2019); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107
(LexisNexis 2017). As in Connecticut, the Iowa statute provides that only the surviving spouse can be
designated by the decedent to use the gametic material. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A.
130. Audra Bailey Wilcox, How Long Does the Probate Process Take in Arkansas?, SEXTON BAILEY
ATT’YS PA (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.arkansas-estateplanning.com/long-probate-process-arkansas/
[https://perma.cc/2YFU-VDRE].
131. Probate
Questions
and
Answers,
IOWA
LEGAL
AID,
https://www.iowalegalaid.org/resource/probate-questions-and-answers [https://perma.cc/D4TB-8FRZ]
(Oct. 22, 2019).
132. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.212 (West 2019). If all issue are also issue of the surviving spouse, then
the spouse inherits all. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.211 (West 2019).
133. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.219(1) (West 2019).
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two children will now share with their half-sibling, reducing that
child’s share to one-third of the remaining property rather than all. 134
Louisiana’s statute,135 which extends the time by which the child
must be born to within thirty-six months of the decedent’s death, may
in some cases prevent PMC children from inheriting from the
decedent. Five states—Colorado,136 Maine,137 North Dakota,138
Vermont,139 and Washington140—have further extended the deadline
for the child to be in utero within thirty-six months or born within
forty-five months. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) chose this
deadline based on section 3-1006,141 which allows an heir “to recover
property improperly distributed, or its value, from any distributees
during the later of three years after the decedent’s death or one year
after distribution.”142 Because none of these states mandate earlier
notice to the personal representative, it is likely that the decedent’s
estate will have been closed long before. Thus, a PMC child who
wants a share would need to sue another distributee—not a welcome
prospect. A Colorado law firm advertises that an “average” Colorado

134. Jane E. Brody, Some I.V.F. Experts Discourage Multiple Births, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/well/family/experts-advise-minimizing-multiple-births-throughivf.html [https://perma.cc/RMQ2-D9QX] (“[M]ore than 40 percent of all I.V.F. deliveries in the United
States are of twins or higher . . . .”).
135. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2018). The decedent can only designate a surviving spouse to use the
genetic material. Id.
136. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120(11) (2019). If the surviving spouse is the birth mother, Colorado
presumes that the decedent consented to be a parent. § 15-11-120(8)(b).
137. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C, § 2-118 (2020). Maine does not expressly require the
decedent’s consent to postmortem conception. Id.
138. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(6)–(11) (2010). Consent to being a parent of a PMC child can be
in a writing or shown by clear and convincing evidence; if the decedent was married at death with no
divorce proceedings pending, the decedent is deemed to have consented in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. § 30.1-04-19(6)–(7).
139. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 707 (2019). Intent to be a parent of a PMC child can be established
by consent in a record or by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.635 (2019). Washington requires either the decedent’s written
consent to being a parent of a PMC child or intent established by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
141. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-1006 (amended 2006).
142. Raymond C. O’Brien, The Momentum of Posthumous Conception: A Model Act, 25 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 332, 363 (2009). Many states have adopted the UPC provision. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3936 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-1006(1)(b) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.3957 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-1006 (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30.1-21-06 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-3-1006 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-1006 (2009).
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estate remains in probate for nine to twenty-four months.143 Because
Colorado has adopted its version of UPC section 3-1006,144 someone
acting promptly on behalf of the PMC child could then proceed
against a half-sibling, an aunt, or another distributee to recover
property from the decedent’s estate.
Then there are the states that have adopted the Uniform Parentage
Act (UPA), which requires some form of writing by the decedent
consenting to parent a PMC child without further legislation
regarding whether that child inherits. Seven states currently have a
version of UPA section 707, requiring written consent to be a parent
of a child conceived postmortem. 145 Four of these seven states have
adopted the 2000 version of the UPA, which applies to a spouse who
so consented:146 Alabama,147 New Mexico,148 Texas,149 and Utah.150
Another three states, Delaware,151 New Hampshire,152 and
Wyoming,153 use the 2002 version of the UPA, which does not
require the decedent to be a spouse but rather an “individual.”154 If
the decedent has consented in writing to be a parent, will the child
inherit? The dominant concern of those drafting the UPA was a
family law concern—rather than inheritance—to ensure that a
nonmarital child would continue to receive support after a genetic
parent’s death.155 Thus, these statutes say nothing about when a PMC
143. Why Does Probate Take So Long?, HAMMOND L. GRP., https://coloradoestateplan.com/probatelength [https://perma.cc/3BND-A9BV].
144. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-1006(b). Maine has also adopted the statute. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-C, § 3-1006 (2020).
145. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
146. Kristine S. Knaplund, The New Uniform Probate Code’s Surprising Gender Inequities, 18 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 335, 342 (2011).
147. ALA. CODE § 26-17-707 (2016) (requiring additionally that a record be maintained by a licensed
assisting physician).
148. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-707 (2017) (requiring a “signed record”).
149. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West 2014) (requiring that the record be kept by a licensed
physician).
150. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (LexisNexis 2019).
151. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2009).
152. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:2(IV) (2014).
153. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (2019).
154. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002) (amended 2017).
155. Paula A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death Parentage: A Different Path for
Inheritance Law?, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 886 (2008).
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child must be in utero or born. However, this section may have had a
different purpose. The official comment to section 707 of the 2000
and 2002 UPA states: “This section is designed primarily to avoid the
problems of intestate succession[,] which could arise if the
posthumous use of a person’s genetic material leads to the deceased
being determined to be a parent.”156 These states may allow a PMC
child to inherit, given a decedent’s written consent that complies with
the statute.
One recent case bolsters that conclusion. The Utah Supreme Court
considered whether a “Semen Storage Agreement” signed by the
decedent could constitute the requisite consent to parent a PMC child
and determined that, based on the specific language, it did not. 157 The
agreement indicated the decedent’s desire to donate his
cryopreserved sperm to his wife in the event of his death and
operated as a contract between the decedent and the storage facility
for the purpose of storing his sperm rather than to determine
parentage and, as a consequence, the right to inherit in intestacy as
the decedent’s child.158 This suggests that, given different language
of consent in a storage agreement or other writing, Utah would allow
a PMC child to inherit.
Although the seven UPA states lack a deadline by which a PMC
child must be in utero or born for the decedent to be declared a
parent, the usual probate timelines still apply for bringing an action.
Two of the seven states have adopted the UPC’s section 3-1006.159
Thus, while a PMC child born a decade or more after a person’s
death might still inherit through the decedent or qualify for Social

156. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002), amended by UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 708 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
157. Burns v. Astrue, 289 P.3d 551, 557 (Utah 2012).
158. Id. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), a PMC child is eligible as a dependent of the decedent
if entitled to inherit pursuant to the state’s intestacy law. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A). While there are other
ways for a nonmarital child to prove dependency, the Social Security Administration states that
inheritance by intestacy is the only way a PMC child can establish that she is a “child.” SSAR 05-1(9),
70 Fed. Reg. 55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005).
159. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-1006 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-1006 (LexisNexis 2019).
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Security benefits, the child would not disrupt the orderly distribution
of the estate.
The most recent of the twenty-three states to adopt legislation,
Florida, recognizes only one form of written consent to parent a PMC
child: a provision for the child in the decedent’s will.160 Unlike
Oregon, which similarly requires that the child be provided for in a
will or trust,161 Florida has no further requirements, such as notice to
the personal representative that the material is available or a timeline
for the child to be born.162
2. A Myriad of Ways to Establish the Decedent’s Consent
The second requirement of virtually all of the legislation is consent
by the decedent in some form in order for a PMC child to inherit. The
one exception is Maine, whose statute declares an individual a parent
if the child is in utero no later than thirty-six months or is born no
later than forty-five months after that person’s death.163
Seventeen states require the decedent to consent in writing to
something: to be a parent of a PMC child, to be its genetic parent, to
authorize a person or a spouse to use or control their genetic material
after death, or some combination of these.164 In the seven states that
have adopted the UPA, the decedent must agree that if assisted
reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased would be a
parent.165 Illinois’s language is similar but adds that the resulting
child must be born using the decedent’s gametes.166 Four states
(California, Arkansas, Iowa, and Louisiana) take a different route:
rather than require the decedent to consent to be a parent, they
require the decedent to authorize the use of his or her gametes
160. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2016).
161. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077(4)(b) (2016).
162. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17.
163. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C, § 2-118 (2020).
164. Carpenter, supra note 10, at 401.
165. ALA. CODE § 26-17-707 (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:2(IV) (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-11A-707 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707
(LexisNexis 2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (2019).
166. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3 (West 2007).
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postmortem. California mandates that the decedent specify in writing
that his genetic material shall be used posthumously for the
conception of the child of a decedent, 167 while the Arkansas,168
Iowa,169 and Louisiana statutes state that the writing must specifically
authorize the decedent’s surviving spouse to use his gametes. 170
Connecticut and Oregon combine the two standards, requiring both
consent to postmortem use of the genetic material and authorization
of the spouse (in Connecticut) or a person (in Oregon) to control the
material.171 Oregon also mandates that the decedent provide for the
PMC child in the decedent’s will or trust.172 New York and Maryland
likewise require the decedent’s consent on two matters. In New York,
the decedent must consent that if assisted reproduction were to occur
after the death of the intended parent, the decedent would be a parent
of the child.173 In addition, the decedent must authorize a person to
make decisions about the use of the material postmortem. 174 In
Maryland, the decedent must consent to both being a parent of a child
conceived posthumously using the deceased’s genetic material and
also to the use of the genetic material after death. 175 As noted earlier,
Florida’s required writing is a will: the decedent must specifically
provide for the PMC child in order for the child to inherit. 176
In five states, the consent need not be in writing. 177 In Colorado
and North Dakota, following the UPC language, consent to be treated
as a parent of a PMC child can be shown by a signed record or by

167. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West 2002).
168. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221(a) (2012).
169. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A(1)(b) (West 2019). Iowa requires that the writing “authorize the
intestate’s surviving spouse to use the deceased’s genetic material to initiate the posthumous procedure
that resulted in the child’s birth.” Id.
170. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2018).
171. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-785 (2019) (requiring that a writing authorize the spouse to exercise
control, custody, and use of sperm or eggs); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077 (2016).
172. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077(4)(b).
173. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3 (McKinney 2012).
174. Id.
175. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis 2017).
176. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2016).
177. See Knaplund, supra note 42.
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clear and convincing evidence.178 However, consent is presumed if
the decedent died married with no pending divorce proceedings.179 In
Vermont and Washington, following the UPA, the decedent can
either consent in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur
postmortem, the decedent intended to be a parent of the child, or the
decedent can establish consent by a preponderance of the evidence
(in Vermont)180 or by clear and convincing evidence (in
Washington).181 In Virginia, the decedent must consent to being a
parent in writing, unless implantation occurs before the death can
reasonably be communicated to the physician. 182
Finally, only one state has amended its statute to make clear that a
child conceived after a person’s death cannot be considered “issue”
and therefore does not inherit from or through the decedent.
Minnesota’s statute states that a parent–child relationship does not
exist unless the ART child “is in gestation prior to the death” of the
parent.183
3. States Without Statutes on PMC Children
We then turn to the twenty-six states whose legislatures have not
yet addressed PMC children. Nine states have statutes that define a
“posthumous child” as one conceived before the death of the
decedent and born thereafter, or contain similar language.184 A tenth
state, Idaho, has updated its statute to make clear that a posthumous
child can be conceived by natural or artificial means, so long as the
178. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120(6)–(11) (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-65 (2017).
179. Carpenter, supra note 10, at 421; § 15-11-120(6)–(11) (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-65
(2017).
180. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 707 (2019).
181. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.635 (2019).
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(B) (2016).
183. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-120(10) (West 2012).
184. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (2011 & Supp. 2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-6 (West 2010); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-2308 (2016); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2104(4) (West 2016); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-108 (2009) (“[C]onceived before his death but born within ten months thereafter . . . .”);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-108 (2015); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2019) (“Any child in the womb of its mother . . . .”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 854.21(5)
(West 2019) (“‘[I]ssue,’ [or] ‘children,’ . . . [includes] a person conceived at the time the membership in
the class is determined and subsequently born alive . . . .”).
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child is conceived before the decedent dies.185 Mississippi lacks a
statute but has defined posthumous child in its case law. The
Mississippi Supreme Court declared in 1925 that a child born within
ten months of the timeframe during which a devisee must be living to
take under a will is “in esse” and thus inherits.186
In these eleven states where legislation or case law defines a
traditional posthumous child, courts have differed on whether PMC
children can inherit if they are not in gestation at the time of the
decedent’s death, with one court in New Jersey holding they can
inherit, and three courts (in Arkansas, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania)
holding they cannot.187 New Jersey’s statute originally declared:
“Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born
thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the
decedent.”188 The court in In re Estate of Kolacy found that this
statute was a “carryover of earlier statutes going back to at least
1877,” and that the legislature, when it adopted this provision in
1981, “was not giving any thought” to PMC.189 The court then
declared that twin girls conceived after the decedent’s death with his
cryopreserved sperm were entitled to inherit under New Jersey
intestacy law, even though not conceived before his death. 190
Three other courts have parsed similar statutes and reached the
opposite conclusion.191 In Finley v. Astrue, the Arkansas Supreme
Court was asked to interpret its statute: “Posthumous descendants of
the intestate conceived before his or her death but born thereafter
shall inherit in the same manner as if born in the lifetime of the

185. IDAHO CODE § 15-2-108 (2019).
186. Scott v. Turner, 102 So. 467, 467 (Miss. 1925).
187. See Knaplund, supra note 42.
188. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (quoting N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:5-8 (amended 2004)). The statute was amended in 2004 to adopt the revised language of
UPC section 2-108: “An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time if the
individual lives 120 hours or more after birth.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-8 (West 2007).
189. 753 A.2d at 1261.
190. Id. at 1262.
191. Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Ark. 2008); Amen v. Astrue, 822 N.W.2d 419, 420
(Neb. 2012); Seaman v. Colvin, 145 F. Supp. 3d 421, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
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intestate.”192 In the court’s view, that clearly meant that “the child
must have been conceived before the decedent’s death” and thus
excluded the PMC child.193 Nebraska’s statute, enacted in 1974,
states: “Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born
thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the
decedent.”194 In Amen v. Astrue, the Nebraska Supreme Court was
asked whether a child conceived via assisted insemination seven days
after her father’s death could inherit from him as his issue.195 The
court answered that she could not because she was not conceived
before his death as the statute implicitly required. 196 In the third case,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
construed Pennsylvania’s statute, which states that “[p]ersons
begotten before the decedent’s death but born thereafter[] shall take
as if they had been born in his lifetime.”197 The court agreed that the
Pennsylvania legislature could not have meant to include children
conceived years after a decedent’s death using a technology that had
not been invented when the statute was enacted.198 The orderly
administration of estates was a concern in all these cases. As Judge
Stanton noted in Kolacy, “[e]states cannot be held open for years
simply to allow for the possibility that after born children may come
into existence.”199 Twins in another Pennsylvania case, for example,
were conceived via assisted insemination using his cryopreserved
sperm eleven years after their father’s death.200
Three states define an “afterborn heir” as a child or descendant
who is born within either 300 days or ten months of the intestate’s
death, without specifying that the child must be conceived before the
192. 270 S.W.3d at 853 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a) (2012)).
193. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 853.
194. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2308 (2016).
195. 822 N.W.2d at 421.
196. Id. at 421, 423.
197. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2104(4) (West 2016).
198. Seaman v. Colvin, 145 F. Supp. 3d 421, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
199. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); accord Mattison ex
rel. M.M. & M.M. v. Soc. Sec. Comm’r (In re Certified Question from the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W.
Dist. of Mich.), 825 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Mich. 2012) (Kelly, J., concurring).
200. MacNeil v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 2017).
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intestate died.201 A person who acted quickly after the death might
meet the deadline. Jeffery Mattison, for example, died January 18,
2001; his widow successfully used his cryopreserved sperm to
become pregnant twelve days later and gave birth to twins on
October 8, 2001—less than nine months after his death.202
Seven states have now adopted the 1990 revision of UPC
section 2-108, which eliminated the terms “begotten” or
“conceived”203 to mandate that someone “in gestation” at a particular
time is treated as alive at that time if he or she lives at least 120 hours
after birth.204 The Michigan Supreme Court, asked to interpret this
language in 2012, held that the statute implicitly required an heir to
be either alive or in gestation at the decedent’s death, and thus a PMC
child could not inherit.205
A few states fail to define an afterborn or posthumous heir.206 For
example, in 2002 Massachusetts’ statute provided: “Posthumous
children shall be considered as living at the death of their parent.”207
Because the legislature had not expressly required an heir to be in
existence when the decedent died, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
201. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.070 (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2105.14 (LexisNexis 2016) (requiring that the child live at least 120 hours after birth).
202. Mattison, 825 N.W.2d at 567, 570. Similarly, the child in Amen was conceived via assisted
insemination seven days after her father’s death and born within nine months of his death. Amen v.
Astrue, 822 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Neb. 2012).
203. Carpenter, supra note 10, at 365; UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-108 (amended 1990).
204. ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.108 (2018) (“An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as
living at that time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth.”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 560:2-108 (LexisNexis 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-108 (West 2012); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 700.2108 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-118 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5–8
(West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-3f (LexisNexis 2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2108
(2012) (“A child in gestation . . . .”).
205. Mattison, 825 N.W.2d at 570 (construing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2108).
206. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (2005) (“‘Children’ means biological children, including a
posthumous child . . . .”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.050 (West 2009) (“All posthumous children, or
descendants, of the intestate shall inherit . . . as if born in the lifetime of the intestate . . . .”); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 132.290 (LexisNexis 2019) (“A posthumous child is deemed living at the death of his or
her parent.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 228 (West 2013) (“Posthumous children are considered as
living at the death of their parents.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 852.03(4) (West 2019) (defining “posthumous
heirs” as those “born after the death of the decedent”). The District of Columbia has a similar provision:
“[A] child or descendant of the intestate born after the death of the intestate has the same right of
inheritance as if born before his death.” D.C. CODE § 19-314 (2012).
207. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 8 (repealed July 1, 2011).
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determined that a PMC child could inherit if she demonstrated a
genetic connection to the decedent and showed that the decedent had
consented both to postmortem reproduction and to support of any
child that resulted.208
The Rhode Island statute excludes all posthumous issue from
inheriting, whenever conceived, although its courts have not yet ruled
directly on the issue.209 Its statute says: “No right in the inheritance
shall accrue to any persons whatsoever other than the children of the
intestate, unless such persons are in being and capable in law to take
as heirs at the time of the intestate’s death.”210 In a 2008 case in
which an heir apparent argued that a mentally handicapped woman
was not “capable in law to take as an heir” pursuant to the statute, the
court stated that the statute “extinguishe[d] the inheritance rights only
of posthumous children and other such persons born after a
decedent’s death.”211
Finally, there are states whose only clue to inheritance of a PMC
child is a statutory survival requirement.212 If the statute says one
who “fails to survive” does not inherit and “surviving issue” do
inherit, does that imply that one must be alive or in utero when the
decedent died? The New Hampshire Supreme Court decided that the
answer was yes, and therefore a PMC child did not inherit. 213 The
court relied on Webster’s Dictionary to define “surviving issue” in its
intestacy statute:
[T]he plain meaning of the word “surviving” is “remaining
208. Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 264, 270 (Mass. 2002). Massachusetts has
since enacted UPC section 3-1006, limiting the time in which a PMC child may sue a distributee of the
estate to the latter of three years after the decedent’s death or one year after distribution. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 3-1006.
209. See In re Estate of Downes, No. WP-2007-0503, 2008 R.I. Super. LEXIS 66, at *7 (Super. Ct.
May 23, 2008).
210. 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1-4 (2011). Missouri has a similar statute that allows for posthumous
children and descendants of the intestate to take, but no others that are not in being and capable of taking
when the intestate dies may take. MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.050.
211. Downes, 2008 R.I. Super. LEXIS 66, at *7, *8.
212. See, e.g., Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1180, 1183–84 (N.H. 2007)
(construing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561:1 (2019)).
213. Id.
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alive or in existence.” . . . In order to remain alive or in
existence after her father passed away, [the PMC child]
would necessarily have to have been “alive” or “in
existence” at the time of his death. She was not. She was
conceived more than a year after his death. 214
II. FIVE REASONS THE LAW DOES NOT MATCH PUBLIC SENTIMENT ON
POSTMORTEM CONCEPTION
So far, twenty-four states have enacted legislation to clarify
whether a PMC child inherits, and just one has concluded that it does
not.215 Court decisions in two states without specific legislation have
also allowed PMC children to inherit under certain conditions. 216 It
would appear, therefore, that these statutes and decisions have made
it easier for parents to decide on postmortem reproduction by
resolving this key legal issue, but in many ways they have not. These
laws and cases have had the paradoxical effect of making it more
difficult for parents to have PMC children for five reasons.
First, some states have enacted a series of requirements that few
are likely to complete.217 Other states have ridiculously short time
periods in which to create a PMC child. 218 Second, few states define
when “conception” occurs.219 Third, hospital protocols for
postmortem gamete retrieval are non-existent or tougher than the
legal standard, so survivors may not be able to start the process.
Fourth, all but one statute require a genetic connection to the PMC
child.220 Fifth, the variety of definitions of “consent” and differences

214. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Surviving, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2303 (unabr. ed. 2002)).
215. Carpenter, supra note 10, at 362.
216. For a list of all fifty states plus the District of Columbia and their statutes or court decisions on
PMC, see Knaplund, supra note 42.
217. See supra Section I.A.
218. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221(a) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-85 (2019).
219. See infra Section II.B.
220. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3 (McKinney 2021).
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in legal formalities mean that one state’s writing is unlikely to be
accepted in another.
A. Stringent Statutory Requirements Make Compliance Difficult
Statutes on PMC children attempt to balance the orderly
administration of estates with the surviving partner’s need for time to
grieve the decedent’s death. Thus, as noted supra Part I, five states
require the person with control of the decedent’s reproductive
material to notify the personal representative that such material is
available.221 If no such notice is given by the statutory deadline, the
personal representative can proceed to distribute the estate without
fear that a PMC child might make a claim. 222 However, several
statutes go beyond the mere notification requirement. New York
requires that the authorized representative not only be given written
notice but also that notice be recorded in the surrogate’s office within
seven months.223 New York also requires the decedent to expressly
authorize a person to use the decedent’s gametes to create a PMC
child so that we know who is required to notify the representative and
record the consent.224 In contrasting, Illinois requires only that “[t]he
decedent had provided consent in writing to be a parent of any child
born . . . posthumously” using the decedent’s gametes.225 Still, the
unnamed person who plans to use the gametes to create and parent
the decedent’s PMC child must serve the writing on the Illinois
administrator.226 Illinois also makes clear that this imposes no duty
on the administrator “to provide notice of death to any person”—
presumably the person who plans to use the gametes.227 If the person
named in the decedent’s storage agreement is an unmarried partner
not provided for in the decedent’s will, and thus not otherwise
221. See supra Section I.C.Error! Reference source not found..
222. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3; CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West 2002);
OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077 (2016).
223. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3(c)(2)–(3).
224. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3(c)(1).
225. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3(b)(3) (West 2007).
226. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3(b)(4).
227. Id.
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entitled to notice that probate has opened, that person may have no
idea that the clock has begun ticking. The statute goes on to state that
using terms in a will, trust, or other instrument such as “children” or
“issue,” even if modified by phrases including “genetic” or “of the
body,” do not allow PMC children to take.228 The statute cautions:
“An intent to exclude posthumous children not in utero at the
decedent’s death shall be presumed with respect to any instrument
that does not address specifically how and when the class of
posthumous children are to be determined . . . .”229
Though “written notice” in Oregon will suffice so long as the
decedent’s personal representative meets the statutory time limit,230
California requires the “person designated by the decedent to control
the use of the genetic material” to give the notice by certified mail,
return receipt requested.231 California strictly construes its
requirements. For example, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a cryopreservation consent form in which a
decedent authorized use of embryos created in his lifetime did not
constitute consent to use his sperm after his death.232 The statutes
include a bewildering array of requirements as to whether the
decedent must sign or date the writing, whether the spouse must sign
it, and whether witnesses must be present. 233
To promote orderly administration of the estate, states have also
set deadlines by which the PMC child must be in utero or born.234 To
allow adequate time for psychological counseling and grieving,
bioethicists and guidelines for postmortem retrieval recommend that
the gametes remain stored for at least six months to a year after the
decedent’s death.235 Arkansas and Connecticut, however, require the
228. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3(e).
229. Id.
230. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077 (2016).
231. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(b) (West 2002).
232. Delzer v. Berryhill (ex rel. C.O.D.1 & C.O.D.2), 722 F. App’x 700, 701 (9th Cir. 2018).
233. See discussion infra Section II.E.
234. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221(a) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-785(a)(2) (2019).
235. Batzer et al., supra note 94, at 1268 (recommending six-month storage); PMSR, supra note 95
(recommending one-year storage). The University of Virginia Medical Center policy for postmortem
sperm retrieval also advises a one-year bereavement period. N. Waler & R. Ramasamy, Policy on
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PMC child to be in utero within a year.236 If the surviving partner is
female, she may need to start fertility treatments soon after the
funeral to meet such a short deadline.237 A study from 2003 to 2012
following more than 157,000 women using IVF found that only 29%
were successful in having a live birth on their first try, so time must
be allowed for several cycles. 238
B. Few States Define When “Conception” Occurs
Several states have statutes that define a “posthumous child” as
one conceived (or begotten) before the decedent died.239 For those
using IVF, the question arises: when is the child conceived? If we use
the traditional definition, when the egg is joined with the sperm, 240
that occurs in a laboratory, and the resulting embryo is then frozen. 241
The plaintiffs in Finley v. Astrue and Seaman v. Colvin, who each
Posthumous Sperm Retrieval: Survey of 50 Major Academic Centers, 106 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2, 44
(2016).
236. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-785(a)(2).
237. In
Vitro
Fertilization
(IVF),
MAYO
CLINIC
[hereinafter
IVF
Overview],
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac20384716#:~:text=IVF%20involves%20several%20steps%20%E2%80%94%20ovarian,one%20cycle%
20may%20be%20required [https://perma.cc/5E35-PTFM]. If the surviving partner plans to use the
decedent’s sperm for IVF, she will need several weeks of hormone treatments to induce ovulation and
time to allow the sperm and retrieved egg to join and successfully implant in the womb. Id. IVF may
require more than one of these cycles to be successful. Id. If the surviving partner is implanting a
cryopreserved embryo, the process may be shorter because hormone treatments are often not required,
but multiple cycles may still be needed. Robert L. Barbieri, Fresh or Frozen Embryo Transfer in IVF?,
NEJM
J.
WATCH:
WOMEN’S
HEALTH
(Mar.
20,
2019),
https://www.jwatch.org/na48672/2019/03/20/fresh-or-frozen-embryo-transfer-ivf. One large study
found success rates of 50% in live births for frozen embryo transfers. Id.
238. Andrew D.A.C. Smith et al., Live-Birth Rate Associated with Multiple In Vitro Treatment Cycles,
314 JAMA 2654, 2654 (2015), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2478204
[https://perma.cc/A97U-NSGE].
239. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (2011 & Supp. 2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-6 (West 2010); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-2308 (2016); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2104(4) (West 2016); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-108 (2009) (defining an “afterborn heir” as one “conceived before [a decedent’s] death but
born within ten months thereafter”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 31-2-108 (2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 854.21(5) (West 2019) (providing that “issue” or “children”
include “a person conceived at the time the membership in the class is determined and subsequently
born alive”).
240. See, e.g., William C. Shiel, Jr., Medical Definition of Conception, MEDICINENET,
https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=31242
[https://perma.cc/H3WR-6Q3S]
(Dec. 21, 2018).
241. IVF Overview, supra note 237.
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used cryopreserved embryos, argued that their children were
conceived the moment the sperm fertilized the egg, while their
spouses were still alive.242 The court in Seaman foresaw chaos in that
path: “[S]uch an interpretation would mean that, as long as any
cryopreserved embryos from the decedent exist as a result of IVF,
there would be no definite time-limit after the death of the decedent
during which the number of intestate heirs could be known.”243
Several states have tried to clarify the issue. The UPC changed its
language from “conceived” or “begotten” to “in gestation.”244
Oregon’s statute declares that an embryo outside of a woman’s body
is not considered to be conceived until implanted in a woman’s
body,245 and the statute further defines a PMC child as one who was
“conceived from the genetic material of a decedent who died before
the transfer of the decedent’s genetic material into a person’s
body.”246 Illinois’s statute has one set of requirements for a
posthumous child in utero at the decedent’s death and a different set
of requirements for one not in utero at the decedent’s death.247 But
not all the statutes allowing a PMC child to inherit have been drawn
this carefully. Arkansas’s statute refers to a PMC child as one
“conceived after the death of a parent.”248 Connecticut requires the
child “posthumously conceived using the decedent’s sperm or eggs”
to be “in utero not later than one year after” the decedent’s death.249
Because states such as Arkansas and Connecticut do not define when
242. Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Ark. 2008); Seaman v. Colvin, 145 F. Supp. 3d 421, 424
(E.D. Pa. 2015).
243. Seaman, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 433.
244. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-108 (amended 2006); see also ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.108 (2018) (“An
individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time if the individual lives 120
hours or more after birth.”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560-2-108 (LexisNexis 2015) (same); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-108 (West 2012) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2108 (West
2002) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-118 (2019) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-8 (West 2007); W.
VA. CODE § 42-1-3f (LexisNexis 2019) (same); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2108 (2012) (replacing the
term “individual” with “child”).
245. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077(1) (2016).
246. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077(4).
247. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-3(a), (b) (West 2007).
248. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221(a) (2012); accord COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120(11) (2019)
(replacing the term “parent” with “individual”).
249. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-785(a)(2) (2019).
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conception occurs, this raises a question for those who use IVF while
both intended parents are alive but implant the embryo after one or
both parents have died. Was the child “conceived” when IVF was
successful or after the embryo was implanted?
C. Hospital Standards for Postmortem Gamete Retrieval Are out of
Sync with Legal Standards
The decision to retrieve sperm or ova postmortem is most likely to
be made in an emergency room and must be made quickly. 250 The
Weill Cornell Medicine’s Guidelines for Postmortem Sperm
Retrieval (Weill Cornell Guidelines)251 advise harvesting sperm
within twenty-four hours after death, which “results in a high
likelihood of viable sperm (86%, with a mean time to retrieval of
20.4 hours after death).”252 A second study found viability up to
thirty-six hours after death. 253 Harvesting ova is more complicated.
Ideally, doctors first give the woman hormone treatments for several
weeks, requiring her to remain alive while in a permanent vegetative
state.254 Because time is of the essence, hospitals and emergency
facilities should have policies in place as to when a request for
gamete retrieval should be granted, but a 2017 survey of forty-one
major centers found that only eleven of those centers (or 27%) had
such policies in place.255 “Few emergency departments . . . have
policies for [postmortem sperm retrieval, or] PMSR, and many
emergency physicians . . . are unaware that PMSR is even a

250. See generally Andrew R. Zinkel et al., Postmortem Sperm Retrieval in the Emergency
Department: A Case Report and Review of Available Guidelines, 3 CLINICAL PRAC. & CASES
EMERGENCY MED. 405 (2019).
251. PMSR, supra note 95.
252. Zinkel et al., supra note 250, at 407.
253. Shai Shefi et al., Posthumous Sperm Retrieval: Analysis of Time Interval to Harvest Sperm, 21
HUM. REPROD. 2890, 2892 (2006).
254. Greer et al., supra note 97, at 282. If the patient is quite young, the eggs might be retrieved
immediately without hormone treatment. Jaslow, supra note 97.
255. Nicholas J. Waler et al., Policy on Posthumous Sperm Retrieval: Survey of 75 Major Academic
Medical Centers, 113 FERTILITY & STERILITY 45, 46 (2018); accord Waler & Ramasamy, supra note
235.
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possibility, leaving them ill-prepared to respond to these requests in
an informed and timely manner.”256
Those few facilities that have policies may be out of step with
legal requirements. For example, the Weill Cornell Guidelines,
covering hospitals such as NewYork-Presbyterian, provide that only
the wife of the deceased can make the request.257 Under these
guidelines, the wife must have both convincing evidence that her
husband would have wanted to conceive children after his death and
the unanimous support of the available members of the immediate
family.258 Like many states, however, New York does not require
that the decedent designate his or her spouse to control the gametic
material; New York’s statute simply specifies “a person to make
decisions about the use of the . . . genetic material” and says nothing
about the decedent’s family.259
The policies at Tufts University, the University of Iowa, and the
University of Virginia (UVA) all require that the decedent has
consented in writing to postmortem gamete retrieval with a specified
recipient,260 but bioethicists have noted that it is “extremely
uncommon” to have a written advance directive for such retrieval and
instead urge a standard of reasonably inferred consent. 261 Tufts and
UVA also require the surviving partner to get judicial authorization
for the retrieval,262 adding more pressure given the lack of time. But
again, these policies do not reflect the state’s laws in which the
medical centers are located. Tufts Medical Center is in
Massachusetts,263 a state that does not require a writing to parent a
PMC child.264 Although the University of Iowa’s medical centers will
256. Zinkel et al., supra note 250, at 405.
257. PMSR, supra note 95.
258. Id.
259. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 2021).
260. Waler & Ramasamy, supra note 235.
261. Batzer et al., supra note 94, at 1265.
262. Waler & Ramasamy, supra note 235.
263. Contact Tufts Medical Center, TUFTS MED. CTR., https://www.tuftsmedicalcenter.org/ContactUs (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
264. Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E. 2d 257, 269 (Mass. 2002); Hanson v. Astrue, 733
F. Supp. 2d 214, 218 (D. Mass. 2010).
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allow a “surviving partner” to make a request, only a “surviving
spouse” can be the other parent of the PMC child under Iowa’s
statute.265 Virginia’s statute similarly specifies a “surviving
spouse.”266 Of course, the patient in the emergency room may not be
domiciled in that state at the time of death. If the medical center’s
policy does not match the state’s requirements, it is better that the
medical policy be broader than the state’s (as with the University of
Iowa and UVA), rather than narrower (as with Tufts).
In two states, if the patient in the emergency room is married, her
consent to be a parent of a PMC child is presumed.267 One state
simply requires the PMC child to be in utero or born within a
specified time of the death but does not require evidence of
consent.268 Another state assumes consent based on the genetic
connection unless doing so would disrupt others’ rights or
administration of the estate.269 Thus, if the emergency room patient is
domiciled at death in Colorado,270 Maine,271 New Jersey,272 or North
Dakota,273 a hospital requiring clear evidence of consent for
postmortem gamete retrieval will go further than the legal standard,
preventing a person from starting the process for PMC.

265. Waler & Ramasamy, supra note 235; IOWA CODE § 633.220A(1)(b) (West 2019). Iowa requires
that the writing must “authorize[] the intestate’s surviving spouse to use the deceased parent’s genetic
material to initiate the posthumous procedure that resulted in the child’s birth.” IOWA CODE
§ 633.220A(1)(b).
266. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(B) (2016).
267. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120(8)(a) (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(6)–(11) (2010).
268. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C, § 2-118 (2012).
269. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
270. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120(8)(b). If the surviving spouse is the birth mother, Colorado
presumes that the decedent consented to be a parent. Id.
271. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C, § 2-118. In Maine, the decedent is considered a parent of the
PMC child if the child is in utero no later than thirty-six months or born no later than forty-five months
after the decedent’s death. Id.
272. Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262.
273. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(6)–(11). Consent to be a parent of a PMC child in North Dakota
can be in a writing or shown by clear and convincing evidence. Id. If the decedent were married at death
with no divorce proceedings pending, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,
the decedent is deemed to have consented. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(6), (8).
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D. All but One Statute Requires a Genetic Connection to the PMC
Child
The vast majority of statutes—all but one274—recognizing PMC
make clear that the decedent must be the genetic parent of the child.
Ten states include express language in their statutes referring to the
decedent’s genetic material or gametes. 275 The seven states adopting
section 707 of the 2000 or 2002 UPA referring to an individual who
“dies before placement of eggs, sperm or embryos” omit that
specificity,276 but the official comment clarifies that the section refers
to the decedent’s gametes:
Absent consent in a record, the death of an individual
whose genetic material is subsequently used either in
conceiving an embryo or in implanting an already existing
embryo into a womb ends the potential legal parenthood of
the deceased.277
New York is the exception as of February of 2021. New York has
amended its statute to change “genetic parent” to “intended parent,”
thereby allowing a non-genetic parent to consent to a PMC child. 278
Prior to February 15, 2021, the statute clearly required a genetic
connection.279 Definitions referred to a “genetic child” and a “genetic
parent,” and in the required writing, the decedent consented to use of

274. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 2021).
275. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221(a) (2012); CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(a) (West 2002); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 45a-785 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2016); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-3(a)
(West 2007); IOWA CODE § 633.220A(1)(b) (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2018); MD.
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077(1) (2016); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-158(B) (2016).
276. ALA. CODE § 26-17-707 (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:2(IV) (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-11A-707 (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707
(LexisNexis 2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (2019).
277. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002), amended by UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 708 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
278. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3.
279. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 2012), amended by N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 2021).
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their genetic material to create a child after death. 280 The new version
now divides PMC children into two sections. Section (b) says that an
instrument created by the decedent that provides for his issue,
children, heirs, etc., will include a PMC child if he completes the
required form within seven years of death and if the child is in utero
or born within the statute’s time limits.281 The sample form for
section (d) requires the decedent to “consent to the use of assisted
reproduction to conceive a child or children of mine after my death,”
with no stipulation that the decedent’s gametes be used.282 Section (c)
applies “[i]f the child was conceived using the genetic material of the
intended parent,” with additional requirements such as notice to the
personal administrator.283 A second sample form requires the
decedent to consent to the use of their sperm or ova to conceive a
child postmortem and to authorize a specific person to control the
decedent’s genetic material. 284 Thus, it appears that a person can
consent to being the parent of a PMC child conceived with donated
gametes by complying with section (d) of the statute.285
Otherwise, except in New York, a decedent cannot consent to be
the parent of a PMC child who is not their genetic child. Yet every
year, thousands of people use donated gametes to conceive children
because they are infertile or do not have an opposite sex partner.286
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported 24,300
ART cycles with donated eggs in 2016. 287 About ten million
280. Id.
281. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 2021).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See id.
286. AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., FACT SHEET, GAMETE (EGGS AND SPERM) AND EMBRYO
DONATION
1
(2014),
https://www.reproductivefacts.org/globalassets/rf/news-andpublications/bookletsfact-sheets/english-fact-sheets-and-infobooklets/gamete_eggs_and_sperm_and_embryo_donation_factsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T325MH2W].
287. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2016
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 46 (2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2016-report/ART-2016-National-Summary-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LJ6H-3P7W]. A “donor egg cycle” is an ART cycle in which an embryo is formed
from the egg of one woman (the donor) and then transferred to another woman (the recipient). Id. at 63.
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American adults identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender.288
The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that more than half a million
same-sex couples are married and 469,000 are cohabiting, with
191,000 children in their households. 289 To have a child, same-sex
couples need donated gametes, but the existing statutes in all states
except New York do not allow infertile or many LGBT decedents to
be the parent of a PMC child.
E. The Variety of Definitions of “Consent” and Differences in Legal
Formalities Mean That One State’s Writing Is Unlikely to Be
Accepted in Another
How does one ensure the decedent’s consent to being a parent of a
PMC child? In many cases, when a person cryopreserves his sperm
or her ova, or when a couple freezes their embryos, the clinic will
present a form detailing various choices for the genetic providers to
select, including the disposition of the material if one or both die.290
Can we rely on the clinics to provide a comprehensive form that will
satisfy the legal niceties and ensure that a PMC child will inherit
from the decedent if that is the desire? The answer is no for several
reasons.
First, for those states whose statutes require the decedent to
consent to being a parent of a PMC child, the language in the clinic
form is designed for an entirely different purpose. In Burns v. Astrue,
the decedent and his wife signed a “Semen Storage Agreement” in
which the decedent specified that, in the event of his death, he would
like his vials of semen maintained in storage for future donation to
his wife, who would assume all of the obligations and terms
described in the contract. 291 In another section, he indicated that his
288. Counting LGBT Communities: SAGE and the 2020 Census, SAGE: BLOG (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.sageusa.org/counting-lgbt-communities-sage-and-the-2020-census/
[https://perma.cc/MZG3-HAG2].
289. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau Releases CPS Estimates for Same-Sex
Households (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/same-sexhouseholds.html [https://perma.cc/47WM-PLE7].
290. Hans & Dooley, supra note 3, at 573.
291. 289 P.3d 551, 551–53 (Utah 2012).
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purpose for storing the semen was “[p]rior to . . . chemotherapy,”
rather than “[p]rior to artificial insemination.”292 Utah’s statute, based
on the UPA, requires the decedent’s consent in a record “that if
assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse
would be a parent of the child,”293 but the Utah Supreme Court found
no such consent here:
The purpose of the Agreement is stated in the first
sentence: “to act as an agreement to store semen . . . .”
Additionally, although the Agreement is based on the
premise that the purpose of storing semen is to create
children, the contract is dedicated to the legal obligations
regarding storage, not use.294
However, in states such as Arkansas and Louisiana, whose statutes
require only that the decedent authorize their spouse to use the
gametes postmortem, the storage agreement might be enough if
executed with the correct formalities. 295
Second, suppose a clinic did choose to modify its form to comply
with the language needed to constitute sufficient consent to parent a
PMC child. Presumably, the clinic would use the language of the
statute in the state where the clinic is located, so any clinics in the
states without such legislation or case law would have no guide. But
even in the seventeen states that require the decedent’s written
consent, the language would be helpful only if the person storing the
genetic material and signing the agreement ended up dying domiciled
in that state because state law at the time of the decedent’s death
applies to determine who inherits. 296 In addition, because of the high
cost of IVF and the lack of insurance, many seek treatment outside of
292. Id. at 557.
293. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (LexisNexis 2019).
294. Burns, 289 P.3d at 557.
295. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2012) (requiring that writing be notarized or witnessed by a
licensed physician or a person acting under the supervision of a licensed physician); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:391.1(A) (2018).
296. Seaman v. Colvin, 145 F. Supp. 3d 421, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
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their home state. Only sixteen states mandate some insurance
coverage for infertility, with the result that “thousands of women
each year . . . opt to travel to clinics in other states (and sometimes
other countries) in search of affordable [IVF] . . . procedures.”297 If
the laws were consistent, this might not be a problem, but the statutes
and cases vary widely in what constitutes “consent.”298
To satisfy the statutory language in the greatest number of these
states, the decedent would need to (1) expressly consent to being a
parent of a child conceived with the decedent’s gametes, if assisted
reproduction were to occur after the decedent’s death; (2) authorize a
specific person (preferably the spouse to comply with the
requirements of most states) to use the gametes for posthumous
conception; and (3) authorize a person (again, preferably the spouse)
to control the genetic material postmortem;299 and (4) provide for the
child in his or her will. 300 Expressly providing for a PMC child in
one’s will would satisfy the law in Florida, where the only writing
accepted is the decedent’s will;301 it would also comply with Oregon
law.
A further wrinkle is presented by Massachusetts, which does not
require a writing but does require evidence that the decedent not only
consented to be a parent but also that the decedent agreed to support
the PMC child.302 We do not yet know what evidence will satisfy this
support standard; none was presented in Woodward, where the
standard was declared.303 In a second case allowing another PMC
child to inherit, the federal court accepted an amended declaratory
judgment by the probate court that the decedent intended to support

297. Megan Leonhardt, Women Are Traveling Far and Wide for Affordable IVF—Here’s Why It Is So
Expensive, CNBC: MAKE IT (Aug. 13, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/13/women-aretraveling-far-and-wide-for-affordable-ivf.html [https://perma.cc/XS8W-VTTM].
298. See supra Section I.C.2.
299. Carpenter, supra note 10, at 401.
300. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077(4)(b) (2016).
301. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2016) (providing that a PMC child “shall not be eligible for
a claim against the decedent’s estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will”).
302. Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 270 (Mass. 2002).
303. Id. at 270–72.
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the child without further details. 304 Executing a will that provides
expressly for a PMC child might indicate such intent to support the
child. Alternatively, we could add to the language in the writing that
not only did the decedent intend to parent the child but also that the
decedent intended to support her.
What formalities would be required for this writing to be accepted
in the maximum number of states? Although six states simply require
a writing or record,305 three others require the writing to be
“signed”;306 two require it to be “signed and dated”;307 and one
requires it be signed and dated by both the decedent and the
decedent’s surviving spouse.308 Two states require the writing to be
kept or maintained by “the licensed assisting physician”309 or “a
licensed physician,”310 and one state requires it to be either notarized
or witnessed by a licensed physician or by a person under the
supervision of a licensed physician. 311 New York requires two adult
witnesses, neither of whom can be named in the instrument to make
decisions about the decedent’s genetic material; in addition, the
document must be executed within seven years of the decedent’s
death.312 Ideally then, adding to the four requirements stated supra,
the writing would be (5) signed by both the decedent and his or her
spouse, (6) dated within seven years of the decedent’s death, (7)
witnessed by two adults (one of whom is a licensed physician or a
person under her supervision), and (8) maintained by the licensed
assisting physician.

304. Hanson v. Astrue, 733 F. Supp. 2d 214, 216 (D. Mass. 2010).
305. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2009) (requiring a record); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-3(b)(3) (West 2007) (requiring a writing); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2018) (requiring a
writing); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(B)(ii) (2016) (requiring a writing); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707
(LexisNexis 2019) (requiring a record); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (2019) (requiring a record).
306. IOWA CODE § 633.220A(1)(b) (West 2019); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b)(1)
(LexisNexis 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-707 (2017).
307. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(a)(1) (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077(4)(b)(A) (2016).
308. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-785(a)(1) (2019).
309. ALA. CODE § 26-17-707(2016).
310. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West 2014).
311. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221(a) (2012).
312. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3 (McKinney 2021).
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If the clinic’s storage agreement or some other writing was
executed with the recommended language and all of the formalities
and if a valid will made a specific bequest to a PMC child, the
decedent would likely be a parent in Massachusetts and all sixteen
states requiring written consent or a record. It would also satisfy the
requirements in the four states where a writing indicating consent is
one option but not the only way to prove consent, 313 in Maine (whose
statute makes no mention of consent),314 and in Florida (whose
statute requires a valid will providing for the PMC child).315 It is
unlikely to satisfy the standard announced in New Jersey, however.
In In re Estate of Kolacy, the court opined:
[O]nce we establish, as we have in this case, that a child is
indeed the offspring of a decedent, we should routinely
grant that child the legal status of being an heir of the
decedent, unless doing so would unfairly intrude on the
rights of other persons or . . . the orderly administration of
estates.316
Unlike all of the other statutes and cases, New Jersey’s analysis does
not include an inquiry into the decedent’s consent to be a parent.
Rather, the state looks at entirely distinct factors that would not be
addressed by either the written consent or the decedent’s will.
III. SOLUTIONS
If we want to allow decedents to parent PMC children, as surveys
indicate, we need legislation with four key features.317 First, because
of the mobile nature of our population, we need either uniform

313. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120(6), (8) (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(6), (8) (2010);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 707 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.635 (2019).
314. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C, § 2-118 (2020).
315. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2016).
316. 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
317. Norton, supra note 5.
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legislation or statutes that will accept consent as valid in the place
where executed or where the deceased was domiciled. Second, we
need a standard that allows not just genetic parents but also the
medically and socially infertile to choose to be parents of a PMC
child.318 Third, to allow time for grieving without disrupting the
orderly administration of the decedent’s estate, the statutes need to
adopt a provision for reasonable notice to the decedent’s personal
representative, plus a more extended time for the PMC child to be in
utero or born. Finally, the statutes need to avoid ambiguous and
outdated terms such as “conceived” or “begotten,” or if such terms
are included, the statutes need to define them precisely.
The uniform or model act that best reflects Americans’ support for
PMC is the 2008 UPC, which allows consent to being a parent of a
PMC child to be shown in three ways: in a signed record, by clear
and convincing evidence, or via a presumption of consent because
the decedent died married with no divorce proceedings pending.319
The UPC has several shortcomings, however. Only two states,
Colorado and North Dakota, have adopted its provision on PMC
children.320 The UPC does not define “conceived after an individual’s
death,” although it does require the child to be “in utero” or “born”
within a particular time to be treated as if in gestation at the
decedent’s death.321 Further, a provision on notice to the personal
representative would need to be added to the statute.
Legislation should address four key issues with PMC statutes.
First, the main obstacle to the UPC language may be the presumption
that a person who dies married has consented to be the parent of a
PMC child. Is that assumption valid? It will be tested if either (1) the
decedent has cryopreserved gametes or embryos before their death,
318. “Social infertility” is one definition that would include “specific life circumstances, like being a
man with a same-sex partner, [that] rendered them unable to conceive or carry a child to term without
medical intervention.” David Kaufman, The Fight for Fertility Equality, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/style/lgbtq-fertility-surrogacy-coverage.html
[https://perma.cc/6RUM-KK6X] (July 24, 2020).
319. Carpenter, supra note 10, at 372–73 (citing UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120 (amended 2008)).
320. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(6)–(11) (2010).
321. Carpenter, supra note 10, at 373 (citing UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(k)).
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or (2) the decedent’s gametes are obtained after death. In the first
scenario, in which the decedent has actively participated in assisted
reproduction and cryopreserved reproductive material, the decedent
will likely have completed a storage agreement directing disposition
at death; that agreement may serve to either confirm or refute the
presumption of consent. Courts have demonstrated a willingness to
follow the decedent’s directions in the agreement rather than a
conflicting demand by a surviving partner or parent.322 The second
scenario—in which the decedent has not cryopreserved any material
but rather the material is obtained postmortem—raises many more
issues. Should we presume simply because the decedent died married
with no divorce proceedings pending that she would want this? In
certain cases, the decision will not simply be legal but medical. If the
patient is a woman older than thirty, retrieving her ova will require a
two-week regimen of hormones. In a case reported by the
Massachusetts General Hospital, a husband’s request for oocyte
retrieval from his wife was denied in part because subjecting her to
the hormonal procedure would have hastened her death. 323 The team
also considered the fact that the patient was on birth control and had
not expressed to her gynecologist any desire to become pregnant,
indicating to them a lack of consent. 324 In a state adopting the UPC,
these might be factors in rebutting the presumption.
Alternatively, if a state preferred its own statute rather than the
UPC version, language of comity could be added to recognize written
consent valid in another state but not in the present one. Such
language is typical in a wills statute. California, for example, accepts
a will as validly executed if “[t]he execution of the will complies
with the law at the time of execution of the place where the will is
executed” or “complies with the law of the place where at the time of
execution or at the time of death the testator is domiciled, has a place

322. See, e.g., Estate of Kievernagel v. Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 316 (Ct. App. 2008);
Speranza v. Repro Lab Inc., 875 N.Y.S.2d 449, 454 (App. Div. 2009).
323. Greer et al., supra note 97, at 282.
324. Id. at 277, 279.
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of abode, or is a national.”325 A similar clause added to a state’s
statute would at least expand the number of states accepting a
decedent’s written consent for PMC.
Second, statutes should allow non-genetic parents who have
participated in ART and wish to be parents of a PMC child to do so,
allowing those with fertility challenges to be on an equal footing. 326
These are people who have used a third person’s gametes to conceive
a child and then cryopreserved extra reproductive material. They may
already have children using those third person’s gametes. Suppose A
and B use A’s sperm and C’s ova to create fifteen embryos,
implanting two to have twins and cryopreserving the rest. As long as
B is alive when the embryos are implanted, B will be a parent of the
resulting children in many states. 327 But if B dies before the embryos
are implanted, B can no longer consent to being a parent of the PMC
children (except in New York) because B is not a genetic parent. As a
2005 survey showed, those without a genetic connection may feel
strongly about cryopreserved embryos; some interviewees referred to
the stored material, all created using donor oocytes, as “siblings of
their living children.”328 This reform is easily accomplished by
simply substituting “intended parent” for “genetic parent” and
eliminating any requirement that the decedent’s sperm or ova be used
to conceive the PMC child.
Third, the proposed statute needs to strike a reasonable balance
between allowing the surviving partner time to grieve and permitting
the estate to close without leaving the PMC child with a choice of

325. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6113(b), (c) (West 2009).
326. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1460 (2008) (arguing that the government can ban a certain ART across the
board, but once it allows a certain one, it should not forbid it in other contexts).
327. If B is the birth mother, she will be deemed the mother by the act of giving birth. See, e.g., CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(3) (2010). If a gestational carrier
were used, B can be declared a parent in a pre-birth order in states such as Delaware and New
Hampshire. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-611(b) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:12 (2014). In
other states, such as Nebraska, B must adopt the child in order to be a parent. Gestational Surrogacy in
Nebraska, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS, https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacylaw-map/nebraska/ [https://perma.cc/F9NQ-SHEL].
328. Nachtigall et al., supra note 84, at 433.
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either receiving no assets in the estate or trying to recover them from
other distributees. With a recommended bereavement time of six
months to a year and the fact that assisted reproduction often requires
several cycles to be successful, the best approach is two-fold.
Initially, the statute should require the person who plans to use the
reproductive material to notify the decedent’s personal representative
within a few months of appointment that the material is available. In
most cases, no such notice will be given, and probate can proceed. If
notice is given, however, the representative can take into account the
possible birth of a PMC child and withhold distribution of some
assets. Notifying the personal representative should be sufficient
without the additional step of recording the decedent’s written
consent, as required by New York’s statute.329 The recording
requirement has two significant drawbacks: it adds an additional
hurdle—making it less likely that the PMC child will inherit—and it
makes the decedent’s consent a public document without adding any
discernible benefit. As for the time when the PMC child must be in
utero, the minimum should be two years, as in California, 330 New
York,331 and Oregon.332 This would allow a year for grieving and a
year for several attempts to achieve pregnancy.
Finally, statutes should avoid using terminology such as
“conceived” or “begotten” and instead carefully define a PMC child
as one who is not in utero when the decedent dies. Looking to the
future, we may want to avoid even the language in West Virginia’s
statute, which requires that the child be “in the womb of its mother”
rather than “conceived.”333 Since 2014, women have successfully
gotten pregnant and given birth following a uterus transplant.334 Is
the baby “in the womb of its mother” if the mother was born without
329. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3 (McKinney 2021).
330. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(a)(1) (West 2002).
331. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3.
332. OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077 (2016).
333. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2019).
334. Denise Grady, Woman with Transplanted Uterus Gives Birth, The First in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
2,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/health/uterus-transplant-baby.html
[https://perma.cc/RD2Z-HZ54].
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a uterus? There is also the possibility in the far future of an artificial
womb; researchers in the Netherlands hope to develop one in the next
decade that would not completely replace the womb but would
function as one for babies born prematurely.335
CONCLUSION
Americans favor postmortem conception. They have said so in
surveys; they have demonstrated their support by cryopreserving
their sperm, ova, and embryos for use following their deaths; they
have made numerous requests to obtain a loved one’s gametes after
that person has died; and they have filed more than one hundred
requests for survivors’ benefits to Social Security for PMC
children.336 Legislatures in twenty-three states have responded by
enacting laws that allow these children to inherit if certain conditions
are met, producing a bewildering array of requirements. 337 Despite
the mobile nature of our population, the forms of consent imposed by
these laws are unlikely to be accepted in a state other than the one in
which they are executed. Hospitals have lagged far behind in
adopting guidelines for determining when sperm or ova should be
retrieved after death, and the few guidelines that have been adopted
are often out of step with legal requirements.
If a state adopts legislation to allow a PMC child to inherit, that
statute should allow the child to inherit—not create unsurmountable
roadblocks, as many of these statutes do. Legal standards that define
consent by the decedent in more than a dozen different ways, that
mandate multiple variations of “dated and signed,” and that by and
large exclude anyone who uses donated gametes make it
unnecessarily difficult to comply. States and courts claim that they
are concerned with balancing the orderly administration of estates
335. Amit Malewar, World’s First Artificial Womb for Humans, TECH EXPLORIST (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.techexplorist.com/worlds-first-artificial-womb-humans/27131/
[https://perma.cc/3CUVMN67].
336. See supra notes 6–9, 40 and Sections I.A, I.B.
337. See supra note 15.
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with the grieving of a surviving partner. Yet, these states and courts
proceed to impose deadlines that require the partner to use the
gametic material immediately or alternatively include a deadline so
long that the estate is almost certain to be closed by the time a PMC
child appears.
These problems can be solved. This Article has proposed four
concrete ways to improve these statutes to comport with our avowed
goal.
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